Cryptographic summary
Receipt digest, pass/fail outcome, engine version, check counts, signature status and timestamps.
02 / Public evidence
This ledger reports genuine, voluntary publications from the working PactVerity Proof Engine. It stores anonymous receipt summaries—not customer names, agreement content or raw evidence.
01 / Live ledger
Every displayed row is hash-deduplicated. A visitor must deliberately choose to publish it from the Proof Engine.
02 / What is stored
The public record is intentionally narrow so that product usage can be evidenced without publishing commercially sensitive agreement data.
Receipt digest, pass/fail outcome, engine version, check counts, signature status and timestamps.
Service, provider, buyer, criteria, raw evidence, wallet address and signature are omitted from this public ledger.
03 / Methodology
Publication is deliberate, privacy-minimised and separate from the private receipt used by the verifier.
A visitor first creates a receipt using the Proof Engine. The receipt remains local unless the visitor explicitly chooses to publish a summary. The public API records the digest and a narrow set of verification fields, then rejects duplicate publication of the same digest. This produces an inspectable activity record without turning private agreement terms into public content.
The ledger is not an adoption counter. One person can create several receipts, and a receipt can represent a test rather than a commercial service. Counts therefore describe voluntary publications only. They must not be interpreted as customers, revenue, unique users, settled transactions or verified real-world delivery.
Researchers and integrators can use the public JSON endpoint to inspect the same bounded records shown on this page. The dataset intentionally omits service names, counterparties, raw measurements, wallet addresses and signatures.
04 / Verification
Independent verification requires the complete exported receipt, including the original criteria, evidence and check results.
If the complete receipt changes, recomputing its canonical SHA-256 commitment will no longer match the published digest. This helps expose altered records.
The public dataset cannot reconstruct omitted evidence or identify the parties. A reviewer needs the complete receipt from an authorised source to repeat every rule check.