Published✓
Internal security review
Review scope, automated verification, limitations and outstanding risks are published without presenting team work as independent assurance.
07 / Security
Trust requires evidence here too.
Proof Engine v1, a public Receipt API beta and a deterministic scenario simulator are operational. An internal security review and external-audit package are published; independent assurance remains pending and will never be implied before an external report exists.
Internal reviewPublishedIndependent auditPendingMainnet protocolNot deployed
00 / Review evidence
Review what was tested—and who tested it.
The internal review documents the current controls and known limitations. The audit request defines the exact work an independent firm must complete.
Audit-readyRFP
Independent audit package
The requested scope covers the web verification stack, API, data minimisation and all value-bearing Solana candidates before deployment.
00 / Live off-chain boundary
Receipt integrity is not evidence truth.
The browser engine and Receipt API beta strict-parse receipt data, re-run the checks, recompute the digest and validate an optional wallet signature. The API processes submitted JSON through hosting infrastructure; it does not turn supplied evidence into an independent measurement.
Off-chain✓
No funds or transaction
Browser receipt work stays local unless a user chooses the API. API evaluation and optional wallet message signing are also off-chain and do not spend SOL or settle value.
IntegritySHA-256
Recomputable receipt
The digest protects the recorded payload from undetected change under the published engine version. Receipts contain user-supplied data.
Limit!
No trusted oracle yet
The engine cannot prove honest collection, completeness, trusted time or real-world delivery. Independent evidence collection is a future layer.
01 / Simulation boundary
Scale tests are not financial history.
The deterministic simulator's default $25,000,000 is synthetic nominal volume from 250,000 model agreements at $100 and 1,000,000 checks. Service and escrow volume is $0.
No TVL, customer volume or assets secured.
The model stress-tests deterministic computation. Its output does not establish revenue, adoption, settlement capacity, audited performance or protection of real funds.
02 / Threat model
Assume every layer can fail.
Security work must cover smart contracts, economic incentives, evidence systems, wallets, infrastructure and governance.
Programs
Code and authority risk
Any future Solana programs could expose assets to logic flaws, unsafe upgrades, account validation errors, authority misuse and integration bugs.
Evidence
Verifier and oracle risk
Any future verifier layer could produce incorrect outcomes through bad data, collusion, bribery, Sybil identities or unavailable workers.
Economics!
Collateral and market risk
If deployed, volatile stake value, insufficient stablecoin bonds or concentrated holdings could weaken the intended incentives.
03 / Before value
Required before meaningful funds are accepted.
- Independent program audits with published reports and remediation status.
- Unit, integration, simulation and adversarial testing for normal and failure paths.
- Transaction, provider and collateral caps during controlled releases.
- Disclosed multisignature signers, upgrade authority and emergency powers.
- Multiple independent verifiers plus challenge and appeal windows.
- Monitoring, incident response and responsible disclosure procedures.
- Publish the full verified PVTY mint address, metadata authority, owner wallet and treasury token account alongside every Solana program ID and release history.
04 / Token authorities
No hidden supply switches.
PVTY has a finalized fixed supply. Mint and freeze authorities are removed; the retained metadata update authority and any future protocol or sale-program authorities are separate disclosures.
| Mint authority | Permanently removed after exactly 50,000,000 PVTY were minted to the published treasury token account. |
|---|---|
| Freeze authority | None. Token accounts cannot be frozen by a PVTY freeze authority. |
| Metadata authority | The selected specification would leave the published owner wallet as update authority for disclosed metadata corrections. That authority would not change a finalised fixed supply or freeze holder accounts. |
| Slashing | Any future slashing must apply only to tokens voluntarily deposited into PactVerity collateral accounts—not to ordinary holder wallets. |
| Upgrade authority | Any future PactVerity protocol or sale-program upgrade authority must be disclosed, protected by appropriate controls and constrained by published delays. |
Public candidate source; reporting channel pending.
The historical sale candidate, escrow candidate and local validation manifest are public for review. An authenticated vulnerability-reporting channel, response target and disclosure policy must still be published before PactVerity settlement custody or protocol value goes live. DEX swaps occur through independent third-party pools. Never include private keys or seed phrases in a report.
Security principle